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Abstract
Despite the vast research in Information Security, the human factor has been
found to lack interest from the research community, with most security re-
search giving focus on the technological component of an Information Tech-
nology system. Regardless of any introduced technological solutions, the hu-
man factor is still subject to attacks and thus, in need of auditing and address-
ing any existing vulnerabilities. This research evaluates the human factor by
the creation of a survey which examines five distinct user properties. Each of
these properties comprise a series of questions, which with their turn assist on
confirmation or refutation of five hypotheses. The survey was conducted on
two higher academic institutions and distributed to all members of staff who
have access on electronic information. Results have shown that the human
factor has a significant role in Information Security; it is confirmed that users’
behaviour is linked to technology interaction, data importance perception and
security oriented education. Furthermore, there is evidence that users who are
non vulnerable to various types of attacks, are not necessarily invulnerable to
social engineering attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Human Error
A system is a collaboration among different entities towards achieving a com-
mon goal. An Information Technology system is a system where people and
technology, having their own components and related activities, interact for
the same purpose. It often occurs that systems fail to function as expected,
and likewise for Information Technology systems. It is not only the machine
part of the system that must function properly but also the user; when a user
fails, human error appears. Human error is actually one of the primary reasons
for system failure. This is a result of trying to reduce the human nature into a
simplified model. The process of simplifying a model to make it easier to use
involves removing elements, which initially might not seem of importance;
but the lack of them could have catastrophic results. Such is also the case with
Information Technology; systems which are human made, are reduced mod-
els of a reality that we want to represent and follow the erroneous patterns of
their creators, us. Our analog nature is constrained in a digital world of bi-
nary digits which obeys the very same commands that we dictate. Therefore,
an error is something that we can expect because there are almost unlimited
possibilities for something unexpected to occur.
1.2 Human Error and System Intrusion
1.2.1 Characteristics of a System Intrusion
System vulnerability is a system state that could allow an intrusion. An intru-
sion is a successful attempt to penetrate a system through exploiting an exist-
ing vulnerability. It is not necessary that a vulnerable component will lead to
an intrusion; however, a responsible system management should keep vulner-
abilities from being exploited. An attacker first tries to identify the weakest
point of a system; although solid looking defences might also be exploitable,
the weakest point of a system offers a higher attack success rate and therefore
it is on average the first to be targeted.[1]
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1.2.2 Targeted System Components
The technological part of an Information Technology system consists of hard-
ware, software and data. These components may be targeted directly or not;
when attacked directly then the human part of the system is not exploited,
when these components are attacked indirectly it implies that the human part
of the system is exploited as well. Figure 1.1 shows component interactions.
HARDWARE SOFTWARE DATA
Figure 1.1: The Targeted System Components
Hardware
Hardware is the physical part of a computer system. It is the lowest level of an
Information Technology system and it hosts both the software and data com-
ponents. Some hardware components are the hard disk, the memory modules
and keyboard. Attacks which target the hardware are usually the hardest to
defend against as most security measures aim the software and data protec-
tion. An example of an indirect hardware-based attack would be a hardware
keyboard listener, installed to deceive the legitimate system user.
Software
Software is the part of the computer system which enables all functions by
harmoniously managing all hardware resources. Software includes the Op-
erating System, any installed applications and hardware firmware as well; it
lies between the user and the hardware and enables the latter to effectively
use the former. Most security solutions are software-based, as it is the most
targeted system component; an example of an indirect software based attack
would be the execution of malicious code on the system through a persuading
email attachment. This would allow the attacker to gain system access when
the targeted user allows code execution by opening the attachment.
Data
Data is all the system output which is generated by the process of software
execution. Data are not directly executed from the hardware but are used in
the software layer. As data we could describe a database configuration, the
database contents or output of a database query. An indirect attack on data
would be to deceive a system user by phone by using a false authentication
and request details for a database record. It is worth noticing that unlike the
rest of the system components, data cannot be exploited directly but only if
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another system component is compromised already. In the given example the
human factor exposes the data after his successful exploitation.
1.2.3 Insecure by Default
Even if one has a perfectly designed system technologically, user is still an
always possible system point of failure. One could tell that any system rely-
ing on human interaction could be insecure by default; considering that all
Information Technology systems have the very same intrusion point, human
interaction. Furthermore, as the assumption is an idealised reality, the truth is
far more insecure than it seems.
1.3 Towards Creating a Secure System
1.3.1 System Security Threats
The first step of creating a secure system in a general context, is to identify
the potential threats. The threats of a system could be categorized as intercep-
tion, interruption, modification and fabrication. These four classes comprise
all kinds of threats that a system could encounter.[1]
Interception
The term interception means that information has become available to an ex-
ternal source without appropriate authority. An external source can be a per-
son, a program or a system, and it could be detected or not.[1] Good examples
of traced and non traced interceptions could be wiretapping which is not suc-
cessful and successful respectively.
Interruption
Interruption is when a system component becomes lost, unavailable or unusable[1].
An example would be when the cables connecting a critical system are inten-
tionally destroyed; then system connectivity is interrupted and the resources
within automatically become unavailable.
Modification
Unlike interception, modification not only involves an unauthorized party ac-
cessing a system component, but also modifying it. Modifications can be de-
tected or not; depending on the technical visibility of changes.[1] An example
of detectable modification would be a computer virus which alters the key-
board output; in that way the user will instantly become aware of a system
alteration. In the other hand, if the same system is infected by a rootkit in-
stead, although there are changes on the system kernel; the user might not
detect any difference in system output or overall experience.
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Fabrication
By fabrication we mean the injection of counterfeit objects from an unautho-
rized party[1]. As these are additional objects it might be easier to detect but it
depends on the attackers’ proficiency. For example a malicious user could in-
sert a module at a bank database server which would deposit to his account for
each transaction a certain very small, and supposedly undetectable, amount.
1.3.2 System Security Goals
Information Security aims to ensure data confidentiality, integrity and availability[1,
2]; three properties which can guarantee data security.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality is present when every system component is accessed by only
authorized parties. The term access includes knowing the very existence of the
system component, viewing or printing.[1]
Integrity
Integrity ensures that the system components can be modified by only autho-
rized parties or manner. Modification includes writing, changing, changing
status, deleting and creating.[1]
Availability
Availability means that system components are accessible to authorized par-
ties at defined times. An antonym of availability would be the denial of service,
where the access to a particular set of objects is denied at a given time.[1]
1.4 Security Implementation
With all threats mapped, reaching the goal of a secure system would normally
be only a matter of cost. However, security is a frequently underrated aspect
of technology. Although a responsible process for building an Information
Technology system incorporates security, one needs to be aware of common
security practices and that the human factor is often the first point of failure.
The existence of the security mechanisms does not itself guarantee an a priori
secure system, just as proper security oriented configuration does not guaran-
tee data protection. For a solid security implementation, human factors should
be evaluated, and addressed when necessary.
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1.4.1 Linking the Human Factor
Regardless of which technological component1 gets compromised, a compro-
mise leads to failure of one or more of the security goals. Therefore, the focus
of the investigation will be on the potential point of intrusion, which in our
subject is the human factor. The attacks will be examined according to human
oriented criteria and not technological ones. Figure 1.2 indicates the topology
of all the basic components on an Information Technology system under attack
and where the human factor is placed within it.
ATTACKER
HARDWARE
SOFTWARE
DATAUSER
SYSTEM ACCESS
TECHNOLOGY
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM
ATTACK
Figure 1.2: Linking the Human Factor
1.4.2 Problem Statement
It is a false assumption that people follow by default secure behavioural pat-
terns and therefore system security expectations should be satisfied. One more
false claim is that security is something that can simply be purchased; the hu-
man factor can prove the most confident expectations false. The human factor
is without doubt a critical point in Information Security. People might take
inexperienced decisions which would allow an attacker to take advantage of,
or might even intentionally attack their premises; as examining the intentional
attack of one on his own premises would involve also topics of wider purport
such as psychology, these will not be presently investigated.
The current work will examine the accidental potential points of intrusion
from a human factors perspective. There will be an evaluation of the overall
existing human factors status. The human factor vulnerability will be tested by
developing a survey, which will be distributed to users who interact with the
targeted installations. The survey will examine the following user properties:
• Population
• Security Oriented Education
1i.e. hardware, software, data
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• Security Awareness
• Installation Environment
• Security Policy
These properties will be defined in detail later in the Model and Methodology
chapter. The initial suggestion is that people who interact with the examined
installations are capable of allowing a system intrusion.
1.4.3 Targeted Installations
The installation environments which will participate on the survey study are
two higher academic institutions. The Domi Educational Group from Hellas
and Oslo University College from Norway. Both schools have a large num-
ber of students; Domi Educational Group has about four thousand students
and Oslo University College more than eleven thousand. The number of to-
tal employees for each school is also high; the estimated personnel which has
access on data is one hundred and fifty for Domi Educational Group and five
hundred for Oslo University College. As both clients are academic institutions
their assets are joined. Both installation environments are interested into a
solid reputation and elimination of any direct or indirect financial losses that a
successful attack could involve.
Academic Institutions as Prime Targets
Academic institutions are often targeted as they offer increased anonymity for
an attacker. With student accounts being created every semester the popula-
tion is not static; therefore they accommodate a much easier way for having a
very clear idea of the system’s internal workings and remaining anonymous
at the same time[1]. It has been reported in the past that attackers who are tar-
geting major traffic websites, first practice on university computers[3]. Such
institutions are generators of curiosity and scientific challenges which often
results in students experimenting upon its own infrastructure[1]. It would be
expected therefore, to receive attacks from the inside even without having a
malicious intention but just for the sake of proof. An institution is expected to
be less secure than a corporate environment and there is usually a less strict
maintenance of the system[4]. In addition, an educational institution environ-
ment might be less secure for enhancing the student experience with a higher
ease of use, something that is also taken advantage of. For all the above rea-
sons, the suitability of an educational institution for examining the human fac-
tor vulnerability is excellent.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter examines the existing literature on the human factor as a potential
point of intrusion in an Information Technology environment. Currently there
is a lack of research in analysing human factors in Information Security, as the
majority of studies is focusing on either usability studies or task analyses[5].
Human factors in relation to Information Technology has been found to be in
need of additional interest from the scientific community[6].
A lecture from McCauley-Bell on human factors issues and their impact
on Information Security, points out that the increased threats of information
technology brought new solutions focused on technological means, while the
human factor related work has been extremely limited; with the only notable
exception of password generation[7]. Many times organizations overlook the
human factor, a factor that security depends upon[8]. Technology is often seen
as the immediate answer to Information Security problems[9]. However, de-
spite the fact that many organizations make use of a high number of techni-
cal security controls, they still show a non proportional number of security
breaches; this happens because Information Security is primarily a human fac-
tors problem that remains unaddressed[6]. Since people are the ones who uti-
lize technology, it is just as important to invest in the human factor[9]. A secu-
rity system, regardless of design and implementation, will have to rely on the
human factor; the continuous implementation of technical solutions will fail
to handle the people[10]. In addition, Schneier states that technology cannot
solve the security problems and believing so shows a lack of understanding of
the problems and technology[11]. Mitnik finds technological protection inad-
equate and argues that users are targeted when the technological attacks fail,
in contradiction with most sources that find users targeted first as the weak-
est system link[12]. Information Security is a set of measures which should be
seen as a system and not a single unit[13]. An Information Security system,
except of encapsulating the human factor as a component, is also described
as a continuously evolving entity[14]. Panko recognizes the intentional threat
from both in and out of the organization premises, without analyzing the unin-
tentional exposure of the system to a threat[15]. A security survey from Cisco
Systems, revealed that users who work remotely, although they claim to have
awareness of security risks, they would still engage into actions which endan-
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ger the system security[16].
The unauthorized use of computer systems is made by either accidental or
deliberate causes[5]. Accidental causes are any unexpected natural disasters
and the human factor1; for example, power surges or misconfiguration[5]. The
deliberate causes are actions made by conscious choice2; for example, using a
program flaw to gain access on a computer system[5]. An evaluation of factors
which produce security breaches, has shown that sixty five percent of the eco-
nomic loss in Information Security breaches is due to human error, and only
three percent from malicious outsiders[7]. Considering the fact that the efforts
to evaluate the human factor in Information Security are basically nonexistent,
it is questionable why there has been so much focus on technological means[7].
People as part of the system interact by developing, implementing and
using both software and hardware; when a user has poor training, an ideal
and flawless software or hardware solution will still not be of any use[13].
Therefore, people will always be a weak system component[13]. Users often
perceive their computer systems as a black box, without understanding or the
functionality or will to know it[13, 16]. A good example is that users want
to operate their computers in the same way as any other household electric
appliance[13]. Many users are found to treat confidential information in an
irresponsible manner, by having empty passwords or using their name as one;
in contradiction to the fact that the same users would never intentionally leave
their keys in the outside lock[13]. Regardless of the partial automation that is
introduced, people are without doubt involved in technology[6]. Therefore,
there is a probability for human error which may result in system exposure[6].
As employees have by de facto access and knowledge about the system,
they are themselves a potential point of intrusion; therefore, the security of
an Information Technology system is greatly affected[17]. Security issues may
come into surface when the skills of the employees are higher[17]. This could
occur if users would need to use additional software or by considering that
they have the knowledge for exploiting any existing system vulnerabilities;
additional software could increase the attack surface and an employee with ex-
ploitation knowledge could willingly attack the organization from inside[17].
However, it could occur that users with higher technological skills usually re-
quire software that they already have the necessary administrative and secu-
rity configuration skills for. Therefore, this would be something that might not
be necessarily true and requires further investigation from the research com-
munity.
Security breaches are often caused by careless and unaware users[14]. The
majority of people want to get their jobs done more than they are interested in
protecting themselves; a behavioural tendency that gives surface for attacks[11].
In addition, most people do not understand subtle threats and they engage
into actions which might expose the system[11]. One more view that was not
mentioned by any of the related sources is the exception handling, or differ-
ently how people might react when something unexpected occurs; many times
1The accidental human derived causes can be also called human error
2i.e. attacks
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attackers rely on the alternative actions that people might take when they en-
counter something for the first time[11].
Another human factors vulnerability is social engineering; it often happens
that attackers directly exploit the user by persuading them to do what they
want[11]. Social engineering is a highly effective attack which bypasses every
technological protection[11]. Attackers usually are taking advantage of a users
trust; building this relation before the attack if necessary[12]. Additionally,
quite frequently social engineering attacks rely on the lack of authenticating
someone, especially when the correspondence happens through a telephone
call; then the attacker might for example pretend to be a person with authority
or a fellow employee in need of help[12]. Schultz highlights the unsolved user
awareness problem which is confirmed from a mentioned survey, showing
that twenty percent of users would not avoid opening email attachments[6].
End users are usually less trained, experienced and security-aware than
the Information Technology staff; that makes them the most subject to attack
personel in an organization. On top of this, the security vulnerabilities for
workstation computer systems are found to be much more than for the server
ones; increasing dramatically the possibility of being targeted and the impor-
tance of security at workstations. With the workstation accepted as the weak-
est link of an Information Technology system, an organization can succeed se-
curity wise only if it incorporates workstations and their users into the defence
frontline.[18]
Security is outlined as a continuous process which require a stopless in-
vestment in both technology and users’ education; technology, as only a part
of it, cannot be the only component for having a secure infrastructure[14].
Users should get educated about risks and responsibilities; education and
awareness[1] are identified as key factors in addressing the human element
of security[16]. Except giving users an understanding of threats existence, it is
also proposed to convince users of the need for security; people would then
follow the security requirements in a given situation[1, 16].
A Masters thesis which evaluates Information Technology security per-
formance, also conducts a human factors evaluation according to awareness,
training and education[8]; however, the evaluation is made from an organi-
zational perspective and not user-wise, so the results do not come from the
users.
A booklet published by a technical group with the topic of system security,
is found to be oriented on asset threats and not security threats on assets, so it
could be described as a more general reference. The target group of this publi-
cation is system administrators and it is written as a sum of good practices and
not a scientific publication. The human factor intrusion probability is only cat-
egorised under the intentional human threats, while there is a clear possibility
of a security incident due to lack of knowledge of the human factor. Although
it is noted that the security issue is mainly a problem born from people; the
suggested addressing is mostly software based, attempting to solve a human
oriented issue by altering the technological component of the system. The au-
thors suggested user-centric solution by enhancing education, is made only
in regards to social engineering.[19] Finally, there is an insufficient identifica-
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tion of the human factor as an unintentional threat and a narrow suggestion of
using user education for preventing attacks on the system.
A publication of a similarly general perspective which aims to cover secu-
rity in an enterprise environment, was also found to lack in consideration of
the human factor role in security[20]. Although the fact that the threat sources
are identified to originate from both inside and outside the premises, in the
given defence examples, the threats are perceived to be out of premises, al-
ways with the intention and attacking through technical means. Therefore,
similarly as the previously reviewed source, the majority of the defence mech-
anisms are either software or hardware oriented. A very brief reference on
social engineering is again made with suggestions for reducing such occur-
rences. The likehood of an accidental exposure of the system through a user
is not evaluated; however, in the appendices the section of the Enterprise Sys-
tems Security Review does include a human factors checklist which mentions
education and awareness, as two attributes which should be examined.
Panko suggests that for designing or auditing security operations, the prin-
ciple of having clear roles should be implemented[15]. The roles define who
does what and determine procedures[15]. Another interesting contribution
is the suggestion to do user training[15]; compiled by three parts, security
awareness, accountability and self-defence[15]. The security awareness train-
ing would aim to help users understand the existence of threats by utilizing
attack patterns and case studies[15]. Accountability training would help users
be familiar with actions that they should either avoid or not, according to spe-
cific rules and the understanding beneath them[15]. By the term or self-defence
training, it is meant to prepare a user for taking an appropriate action during
an attack; in addition, part of the self-defence training should be using the
users on detecting problems or reporting improper user behaviour[15]. An al-
ternative solution of Mitnik is having basic training for everyone and further
training according to the users’ specific position[12]; a solution which takes
into consideration the role principle that Panko gives.
Hinson recognizes awareness as the most cost-effective security control
and makes a suggestion on how to optimise control investment; however,
without giving a solution[9]. In regards to proactive risk management, it is
found that many organizations evaluate new products and do periodic testing
on the technological part of their systems, but very few make a serious attempt
to identify risks in relation with the system users[9]. Improvements in security
require improved understanding of feedback[10]; since the feedback from the
technological component can be automated3, a remaining uncovered topic is
the one of human factors.
While Kraemer creates a human factors evaluation method for computer
and Information Security, it does have certain constraints. The derived vul-
nerability evaluation follows a technical vulnerability audit and it takes place
on top of vulnerabilities with the human factor components[5]; this limits the
possibility of having a human factors vulnerability evaluation without inspect-
ing the technological component. In addition, the vulnerability evaluation is
3i.e. software/hardware monitoring
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made only according to the earlier found technical vulnerabilities[5] and there-
fore there is a large part of the human factor, the non technical unintentional
vulnerabilities, which remain unaddressed. The feedback comes through qual-
itative interviews with the involved network administrators and not the end
users[5]; while by doing the opposite the obtained information would be more
prosperous and realistic. Furthermore, the evaluation is qualitative and based
on results which come from a qualitative analysis software package[5]; which
raises a risk of inconsistency as the results may vary if an improper categoriza-
tion is made.
The previously investigated sources constitute the scientific basis for the
exploration of human factors as a potential point of intrusion. The human
factor is without doubt a critical part of Information Security[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
13, 14, 16, 17, 19]. This occurs as users expect technology to be there and work
for them[13, 16] or simply because they overtake any security mechanism for
getting their jobs done[11]. With users being the most targeted and vulnerable
link of an Information Technology system, their defence should be of a higher
priority[18]. The primary focus of an investigation should be on the education
and security awareness of the user[9, 16, 19, 20], two attributes which may
define exploitability as well. For addressing the human factor vulnerability,
education is recognized as a key factor[1, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16].
11
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Chapter 3
Model and Methodology
This chapter goes through the approach used in the current study for evaluat-
ing the human factor in the context of Information Security. The potential of
an unintentional security exposure of the system is examined. This approach
contributed to exploring the human factor in relation to attributes which affect
behaviour. The entire work is kept as general as possible1 in order to enable a
later use in future research.
3.1 Research Method Types
There are two main research methods, quantitative and qualitative. The dis-
tinction between quantitative and qualitative methods is made in accordance
to the question which is asked, the method behind the answer, and the preci-
sion that one requires[21].
3.1.1 Quantitative
Quantitative research applies mathematical modelling and connects the prod-
uct of research with it. In a quantitative method, the outcome will be measured
in relation to a quantity. This method is used in research where measurables
can be enumerated and mathematical relationships are known. A weakness of
quantitative research is when it comes in need to investigate many, different re-
alities in various depths[22]. The greatest advantage is a more concrete frame-
work and that the data are in an easier to analyse form[22]. During the early
steps of evaluating research methodologies, quantitative research looked like
the most favoured choice. However, as the subject of study is anthropocentric
and quantitative research makes it more difficult to receive a broader spectrum
of answers, there was an evaluation of the qualitative research as well.
3.1.2 Qualitative
Qualitative research involves measuring data which is usually related to hu-
man actions and the grounds behind them. Qualitative research is mostly used
1i.e. not constrained to examine academic institutions only
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in behavioural sciences[21]. Qualitative data cannot be always quantified and
measured in relation to a quantity; thus, qualitative research is inefficient when
it comes to identifying, measuring or quantifying a single statistic[22]. How-
ever, an advantage of this research method is the ability to examine given phe-
nomena with respect to multiple human perspectives. The free nature of re-
search allows a more rich input that might contribute to a more specific learn-
ing outcome[22]. Qualitative research is more appropriate for human oriented
study research. Lack of numeric scoring allows freedom of choice on both
questions and answers, and can offer a great input of knowledge to the study.
A great disadvantage in comparison with quantitative research however, is
that the data cannot always be quantified.
3.1.3 Summary
Quantitative methods, although lacking the flexibility of examining multiple
perspectives, makes it possible to examine most areas of interest through care-
fully predefined questions. The capability to analyse the data without en-
gaging into a process of quantification makes the entire process faster; which
would result on the ability of having a larger target group as well. While qual-
itative methods offer significant freedom of input, it also limits the number
of people who can participate in the evaluation; interviewing several people
and analysing the results can be very time consuming. In addition, it can be
difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a remote interview at the participating
institute in Hellas; an email interview correspondence could be a lengthy pro-
cess, in which not many people will be willing to engage. As the human factor
evaluation outcome may vary from user to user, having a smaller data pool
could result in a less pragmatic result; for this and the rest of above stated
reasons, the desired outcome is best addressed by following a quantitative re-
search method.
3.2 The Research Process
For the examination of the human factor, there were defined user properties,
highlighted by the reviewed literature or considered to affect the human be-
haviour in an Information Technology environment. These user properties are
investigated via corresponding questions. Many of these questions contribute
to defining several user properties. The next step was to create hypotheses to
be tested for various user properties. At the final stage, the data collection and
analysis takes place. The followed research process flow is visualised in Figure
3.1.
3.2.1 Principles
The validity of this research depends upon the presence of prerequisite estab-
lished and consistent knowledge. The first used scientific principle states that
14
Identifying the 
Important 
Factors
Formulating a 
Hypothesis
Collecting 
Relevant 
Information
Testing the 
Hypothesis
Working With 
the Hypothesis
Reconsidering 
the Theory
Asking New 
Questions
Asking the 
Question
Figure 3.1: The Research Process Flow Diagram
15
“Security mechanisms do not result on an a priori secure system”; it has been
shown that regardless of the introduced security mechanisms on a system,
they would still be insufficient to ensure security. The second used scientific
principle states that “Man as part of the system can be a point of intrusion”;
it is proved that man can have a significant role on the system security, as a
factor that interacts with the system it can always be a point of intrusion. If
these two principles would not be considered as established, the current work
would not apply in the given circumstances.
3.2.2 User Properties
The primary aim of defining properties for the human factor was to cover dif-
ferent perspectives. In the course of reviewing the existing work on identifying
and addressing the human element of security, education and awareness were
found to be repeatedly mentioned among the sources as key factors[9, 16, 19,
20]. However, there are more elements which would need to be examined for
more extensive coverage; in addition to security oriented education and security
awareness the user properties which were added were the population, the in-
stallation environment and the security policy. All the defined user properties
may affect the behaviour of a user in the context of an Information Technology
installation.
For investigating user properties, several questions were made in relation
to each; many of these questions contribute knowledge on more than one user
property, they were categorized on the one to which they contribute the most
and also linked to related ones. Not all derived questions give value to a hy-
pothesis, but all give value to at least one user property.
Two additional user properties of responsibility and compliance were found
to arise from a users behaviour but not to define it. For this reason they were
included and linked to the questions which would contribute knowledge, but
no questions were categorized as specifically measuring them, nor they were
used for the evaluation of any of the hypotheses. The user properties along
with the contributing questions can be seen as a relational matrix in Table 3.1;
where the user properties are listed horizontally and the questions2 vertically.
Population
The user property of population examines individual user characteristics. The
questions under this category give an insight on the users experience and in-
teractivity with technology, data protection responsibility and security inci-
dent record. The addition of this user property assists in examining the results
per certain population criteria.
Security Oriented Education
The user property of security oriented education helps to evaluate the knowledge
level of a user. This investigates if previous security training exists and the
2Categorized by user properties
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knowledge of a user about password practices3. Apart from the highlighted
importance which this property was found to have in Information Security[9,
16, 19, 20], its inclusion allows the evaluation of the human factor by education
criteria.
Security Awareness
The user property of security awareness evaluates the user’s consciousness of
various points of intrusion; this takes place by giving cases which could po-
tentially lead to a system compromise. This could also be considered as a
vulnerability evaluation of each user. While security oriented education exam-
ines practical and basic knowledge, security awareness examines the existence
of theoretical knowledge which would help a user to identify, and therefore
avoid, a potential threat. Security awareness has been identified as a major ele-
ment of the human factor in Information Security[9, 16, 19, 20].
Installation Environment
The user property of installation environment investigates the user’s security
alertness and consciousness in relation to the work environment and the envi-
ronment itself. An installation environment may for example restrict the user’s
behaviour for reducing the possibility of a system exposure; or oppositely, it
could allow such user’s freedoms which could lead to system vulnerability.
Security Policy
The user property of security policy questions examine the installation environ-
ment policy. This user property examines cases in which the policy can control
the human factor and thus prevent exposure. While security policy might be en-
forced through the installation environment, policy can also be a directive which
relies on a user’s will not to be overruled.
3.2.3 Formulating the Hypotheses
The developed questions and the user properties to which they contribute
knowledge, in turn support or refute five hypotheses which are made in re-
gards to the human factor. The hypotheses along with the contributing ques-
tions can be seen in a relational matrix in Table 3.2; where the hypotheses are
listed horizontally and the questions4 vertically.
3i.e. password generation and renewal
4Categorized by user properties
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First Hypothesis
The first hypothesis is that “Security awareness increases for the population
with higher interaction with technology”. The dimensions which are evalu-
ated are security awareness against interaction with technology. This hypoth-
esis is based on the assumption that people who interact more with technology
have the potential to be more security-aware.
Second Hypothesis
The second hypothesis is that “Population who perceives personal and work
data as more important to protect would be more invulnerable to attacks”.
The dimensions which are evaluated are data importance perception against
invulnerability. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that people who
perceive their data less important to protect are more likely to engage into
actions which could expose the system to a threat.
Third Hypothesis
The third hypothesis is that “The population with a higher security education
will be less vulnerable”. The dimensions which are evaluated are security ed-
ucation against vulnerability. This hypothesis is based on the common-sense
observation that people with higher security education have the potential to
be less subject to attacks.
Fourth Hypothesis
The fourth hypothesis is that “The population who experienced a security in-
cident is more security-aware”. The dimensions which are evaluated are se-
curity incident status against security awareness. This hypothesis is based on
the common-sense notion that people who had a security incident in the past
have the potential to be more security-aware.
Fifth Hypothesis
The fifth hypothesis is that “Invulnerability to social engineering does not cor-
relate with other invulnerabilities”. The dimensions which are evaluated are
social engineering invulnerability against other invulnerabilities. This hypoth-
esis is based on the assumption that social engineering invulnerability does
not correlate with other invulnerabilities due to the difficult to detect nature of
social engineering attacks.
3.2.4 Data Collection
The data collection took place in the form of a survey. The derived survey
was distributed by email through the Information Technology department of
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each participating institution at the users’ work email addresses. The users
must visit a link, complete the survey and submit electronically their answers.
As various data fields are essential for the overall evaluation of a user, all
questions were made compulsory. Allowing incomplete entries could result
in more results to analyse, but it would add significant complexity to data
analysis.
The survey was submitted to all members of staff who have access to query
or edit electronic information. Any other member of staff would be consid-
ered irrelevant as the survey is focused upon people who have access on an
Information Technology system. The authorization for conducting the survey
was granted by the Information Technology department of the participating
institutions. The survey was distributed to all the target population and to
increase potential participation from the educational institution in Norway, it
was translated to Norwegian language prior to distribution.
As the component under investigation is the user, the results might be af-
fected by a various environmental factors such as cultural or social. The in-
stitutions where the experimentation will take place are heterogeneous envi-
ronments, with people of various technical expertises, who interact with an
Information Technology installation. The participating institutions are known
to differ in the number of employees, number of enrolled students, and ge-
ographical location. Another factor that might give erroneous results, is that
people could reply differently than they would act; for example users could re-
ply that they would not enter their credentials on a website which starts with
“http://”, but in real life they would not check if this is the default for their
web based email service.
Software Tools
The software tool which was used for creating the survey and collecting the
data was Google Docs5. Google Docs is a web based application that allows
the creation of various document types. Among the documents that can be
created, there are forms which function as an interface for inserting data to a
spreadsheet. This represented great time savings over the option to distribute
the survey in a printed form, and thus it was the preferred method for data
collection. A disadvantage of Google Docs is that it is not possible to prevent
people from submitting multiple replies; something which could result in du-
plicate entries.
Ethical Considerations
For informing the survey participant of the followed ethical practices, a page
of informed consent was added on the very beginning of the survey. This page
included:
• The purpose of the research
5https://docs.google.com/
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• The name and contact details of the conductor
• The identification of the authorization contact at the given institution
• An assurance of non-coercion
• An assurance of confidentiality
• An assurance of privacy
• An assurance of protecting from harm and offer to withdraw from com-
pleting the survey if this would be considered harmful
Conforming to the basic principles of ethical research, the only collected
data is the participants’ answers and the timestamp of submission. The times-
tamp value was only used to remove accidentally submitted duplicate records.
The survey took place for the duration of a week for each institution, after
which it was not available anymore online. The full text of the informed con-
sent page can be found in the Appendices.
3.2.5 Data Analysis
The data analysis evaluated whether the hypotheses are verified or not, and
drew general conclusions in regard to the users’ answers. The fact that users
from two different institutions participate, can enhance the results validity by
comparing them to each other. Therefore, other than analysing the results in-
dividually, a comparison was done as well. Furthermore, there are several
questions which contribute to user properties and hypotheses; this enhances
the factor analysis which will be used, by having many questions contributing
to a factor score[21, 23]. The aim of using factor analysis in results interpreta-
tion, is to have one factor for each measurable dimension per hypothesis.
An important point which could influence the results is that of relating the
questions with a hypothesis dimension and the lack of using weighting factors.
If the questions which are linked to a factor will not contribute significantly or
are wrongly assigned to this factor, then the results will be less accurate or even
invalid. One more issue is that several of the examined attack cases, are less
likely to occur; for example, an email with a malicious attachment is a more
frequently occurring attack than someone visiting a user’s office and installing
a keyboard capture device. During question creation, the weighting factors of
each question were not taken into consideration as this would be a lengthy
process, requiring a comprehensive analysis of the importance of each.
Software Tools
The data analysis was performed by using the R6 software for statistical com-
putation. As Google Docs exported the data in a spreadsheet format, the con-
version to a readable by R format was made by Microsoft Office Excel7. Before
62.9.0 release
72007 SP2 release
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exporting the data, to reduce sampling error, all duplicate records with times-
tamp less than a minute were removed. The developed R script which was
utilized for analyzing the results can be found in the Appendices.
3.3 Human Factors Security Survey
3.3.1 Questions
This section presents the derived questions for measuring each chosen prop-
erty. All questions are designed to have predefined answers, for which the
survey participant has to choose one or more options8. For each question there
are listed:
• The question measurable
• The actual question9
• The predefined answer options10
• The user properties and the hypotheses11 that the question might aid in
testing
• The expected information that the question may supply
Population
The population property examines personal characteristics of each individual
that completes the survey. Such are the experience and interactivity with tech-
nology, the data protection responsibility and the security incident record. By
including this user property later there can be an evaluation of the results per
certain population criteria.
First Question The first question requires from the user to state his level of
experience on using a computer system. The question is:
What is the level of your computer skills?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Beginner (e.g. word processing, Internet browsing)
• Intermediate (e.g. installing programs, installing devices)
• Advanced (e.g. troubleshooting and administrative tasks)
• Professional (e.g. administering systems for other users)
This question contributes to the user property of population. It is not used in
the evaluation of any hypothesis but it adds important knowledge regarding
the population.
8The twelfth question is the only exception
9With the relevant help text when existed
10With the relevant help text when existed
11If any
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Second Question The second question requires from the user to choose the
number of years that he is using a computer system. The question is:
How many years of experience in working with a computer system do you
have?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Less than a year
• 1-5 years
• More than 5 years
This question contributes to the user property of population. It is not used in
the evaluation of any hypothesis but it adds important knowledge regarding
the population.
Third Question This question measures the user interactivity of the user
with technology, by measuring the Internet usage in hours per day. The ques-
tion is:
On average, how many hours per day do you use the Internet?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Less than 3 hours
• 3-8 hours
• More than 8 hours
This question contributes to the user property of population. It is used at the
first hypothesis as it directly gives an insight into user interactivity with tech-
nology. It may be assumed that a user who browses the Internet more hours
per day, has already adopted technology to a greater extent than one who does
not.
Fourth Question This question measures the user interactivity of the user
with technology, by measuring the frequency with which a user checks his
email. The question is:
On average, how often do you check your email?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• At least once per hour
• At least once per day
• At least once per week
• Less than once per week
This question contributes to the user property of population. It is used at the
first hypothesis for measuring the user interactivity with technology. A user
who checks email more often, is considered to have a more frequent contact
with technology than one who does not.
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Fifth Question This question evaluates if the targeted population uses in-
stant messaging applications. The question is:
Do you use any instant messaging applications?
(e.g. Google Talk, Skype, Windows Live Messenger)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user property of population. It is used in study-
ing the first hypothesis as it gives a view of the users’ interactivity with tech-
nology. Population which uses instant messaging applications has one more
way of interacting with technology, in contradiction with population who does
not.
Sixth Question This question evaluates if the targeted population is a mem-
ber of a social networking platform. The question is:
Do you have a profile on any social networking web site?
(e.g. Facebook, MySpace, Windows Live Spaces)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user property of population. It is used in study-
ing the first hypothesis as it gives an insight of the user’s exposure to technol-
ogy. A user who is member of a social networking platform, could have a
higher interaction with technology than someone who is not.
Seventh Question This question evaluates the population feeling of respon-
sibility when it comes to personal data protection. The question is:
How important is it to protect your personal data?
The user has to choose an option from the following range:
• 1. Extremely important
• 2.
• 3.
• 4.
• 5. Not important at all
This question contributes to the user properties of population, responsibility and
compliance. It is used at the second hypothesis as it shows the population re-
sponsibility at personal data protection.
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Eighth Question This question evaluates the population feeling of responsi-
bility when it comes to work data protection. The question is:
How important is it to protect your work data?
The user has to choose an option from the following range:
• 1. Extremely important
• 2.
• 3.
• 4.
• 5. Not important at all
This question contributes to the user properties of population, responsibility and
compliance. It is used to study the second hypothesis as it shows the population
responsibility at work data. In combination with the previous question it can
also add an insight on the different importance level that people might have
between home and work data protection.
Ninth Question This question queries the online fraud incident history of
the population. The question is:
Have you ever been victim of online fraud?
(e.g. identity theft, phishing)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
This question contributes to the user properties of population and responsibil-
ity. It is used at the fourth hypothesis as it reveals whether a certain type of
security incident did exist.
Tenth Question This question queries the population security history when
it comes to malicious software. The question is:
Has your work or home computer ever been infected by malicious software?
(e.g. keylogger, rootkit, spyware, virus)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
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• No
• I don’t know
This question contributes to the user properties of population and responsibil-
ity. It is used at the fourth hypothesis as it reveals whether a certain type of
security incident did exist.
Security Oriented Education
The user property of security oriented education investigates if previous secu-
rity training exists and the knowledge of a user about password selection. This
sector contributes significantly to study of the third hypothesis where popula-
tion with a higher security education is evaluated.
Eleventh Question This question queries whether the user has ever received
computer security training. The question is:
Have you ever received computer security training?
(e.g. lecture, presentation, seminar)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user property of security oriented education. It
is used at the third hypothesis as it is expected to give a view of the population
who has security training.
Twelfth Question This question tests which sources are used from the pop-
ulation for creating a password. The question is:
Which of the following do you use for generating your passwords?
Check all boxes that apply
The user has to choose one or more from the following options:
• Personal Information (e.g. date of birth, place of birth, address, name)
• Dictionary words (e.g. apple, backyard, cloud, door)
• Phrases (e.g. It is not in the stars to hold our destiny but in ourselves)
• Numbers (e.g. 0, 1, 2, 3)
• Symbols (e.g. !, #, %, &)
• Lowercase letters (e.g. w, x, y, z)
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• Uppercase letters (e.g. A, B, C, D)
This question contributes to the user properties of security oriented education
and responsibility. It is used to study the third hypothesis because it shows the
knowledge of users about creating strong passwords. A good password on a
healthy system prevents unauthorized access to external sources.
Thirteenth Question This question tests the users preference on password
length. The question is:
On average, how long in characters are your generated passwords?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Up to 7 characters
• 8 or more characters
• As short as the system accepts
This question contributes to the user properties of security oriented education
and responsibility. It is used to study the third hypothesis as the knowledge
of password length is part of the knowledge for a strong password. It is not
only enough to have a well generated password; the longer a password is, the
harder it would be for a malicious user to recover it.
Fourteenth Question This question measures the frequency with which a
user changes his email password. The question is:
On average, how often do you change your personal email password?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• At least once per 3 months
• At least once per 6 months
• At least once per 12 months
• Only when required by the system
• Never
This question contributes to the user properties of security oriented education
and responsibility. It is used at the third hypothesis as it shows a users knowl-
edge on a secure password policy. A frequently changed password is harder
to be recovered than a less frequent of the same strength. The change of a
user’s personal email password is not enforced by any policy other but him-
self; therefore, it shows one’s responsibility when it comes to personal data
security.
28
Security Awareness
The user property of security awareness evaluates the user’s personal secu-
rity alertness for various points of intrusion. It is the only property which is
used in the study of all five hypotheses. The social engineering questions are
included in this property because, although such attacks might take place at
work environment, their success relies on users’ lack of awareness.
Fifteenth Question This question checks if the user has the same password
for many different accounts. The question is:
Do you reuse the same password for several user accounts?
(e.g. personal email account, work email account)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. If someone uses the same password for more than one account,
then in case that an attacker gains access to one of them, the security of all
might be at risk[24]. It is also often that people might have one strong pass-
word which they use for several user accounts; thus making them all vulnera-
ble upon one’s compromise, regardless of the password strength.
Sixteenth Question This question checks if the user would write down a
complicated password. The question is:
If you were not able to change a password that is difficult to remember,
would you write it down?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
• Maybe
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. By writing down a password which is difficult to remember then
it is much easier for an attacker to get access. One common example of such
bad practice is when users are writing their passwords and attach them on ei-
ther their computer system or desk; then once an attacker can be where the
computer system is, the very purpose of having a password at all becomes
obsolete.
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Seventeenth Question This question checks if the user is visually securing
his credentials entry. The question is:
Do you prevent others from watching you type when you enter your
username and password?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. The lowest technologically form of eavesdropping is when some-
one captures a password by simply watching a user entering it[24]. When a
user enters his username and password, it should be of his responsibility to not
allow anyone to look at his typing. Even a partial recognition of the password
might significantly accelerate the ability of an attacker to recover the whole.
Eightteenth Question This question checks if the user needs a password to
login to his home computer. The question is:
Do you use a password to login to your home computer?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, responsi-
bility and compliance. When a user has a password enabled account at his home
computer he prevents a wide spectrum of attacks. A password enabled home
computer, could furthermore show the responsibility that one has towards a
simple security practice, over the convenience of not using a password to lo-
gin.
Nineteenth Question This question checks if the user has installed antivirus
software on his home computer. The question is:
Do you have antivirus software installed on your home computer?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
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This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, responsi-
bility and compliance. The antivirus software is an essential part of a system
security that prevents the execution of malicious code. A responsible user
should make sure that antivirus software is installed on his home computer.
Although the user’s home computer might be of such an architecture or hav-
ing installed such an operating system that is perceived more secure, there
are several threats in the wild for all architectures and operating systems and
in general principle although there is still a significantly lower possibility of
having certain systems infected, the possibility still exists[25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30].
Twentieth Question This question evaluates if the user would allow some-
one to use his home computer under his supervision. The question is:
Would you allow someone to use your home computer with your
supervision?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, responsi-
bility and compliance. The physical access on a computer system usually tears
down most of the defensive mechanisms against malicious users. Further-
more, an attacker might execute tasks in such a way, which would not be
suspicious at all in the eyes of the supervisor. However, a supervisor with
professional computer knowledge could efficiently monitor every activity that
one engages when using his computer system.
Twenty-first Question This question evaluates if the user would allow some-
one unsupervised to use his home computer. The question is:
Would you allow someone to use your home computer without your
supervision?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, respon-
sibility and compliance. Although the physical access might lead to a security
compromise, when the actions of an attacker are supervised, there is a limita-
tion and absolute dependency on the supervisor skills to recognise any mali-
cious actions. If there is a total lack of supervision, the attacker is free to act
and this would almost guarantee a system compromise.
31
Twenty-second Question This question evaluates if the user would open an
email link or attachment from a familiar email address. The question is:
Would you open an email link or attachment from an email address you
recognize?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. Specially crafted email links or attachments, might deceive the
user to enter his credentials or allow code execution that would compromise
the system security. An email address which seems familiar would be less
suspicious for the receiving end. In addition, not all users have the technical
expertise to recognise spoofed email headers and from the ones who can, there
is few who validate in depth the origin of an email.
Twenty-third Question This question evaluates if the user would open an
email link or attachment from an unfamiliar email address. The question is:
Would you open an email link or attachment from an email address you do
not recognize?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. Despite the fact that a user might not recognise the email address
that send him an email, it might be of such a content that might temp him
to open an email link or attachment; an action which could trigger a system
intrusion.
Twenty-fourth Question This question evaluates if a user would share his
account credentials with someone else. The question is:
Would you share your username and password with someone else?
(e.g. friend, colleague, assistant, teammate)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
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This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. One of the less expecting but yet often occurring ways of getting
access to a system is to ask someone for his username and password. Many
people would even offer their account credentials by themselves in order to
get help or, for the sake of offering comfort, to a usually familiar person[24].
The security risk of such an action is very high as there is not only the potential
misuse of the credentials to be considered, but also the overall system security
responsibility and risk, which expand to one more person.
Twenty-fifth Question This question checks if the user would enter his ac-
count credentials on a website which uses the insecure Http protocol. The
question is:
Would you enter your username and password on a web site whose address
starts with “http://”?
(e.g. http://www.example.com/ )
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security oriented education
and security awareness. The Http protocol transfers the data in a plain text
format, which allows an attacker to potentially capture the transmitted traffic.
A user with security awareness and knowledge of the Https protocol which
incorporates data encryption, would prefer it for transmitting his credentials.
Twenty-sixth Question This question checks if the user would enter his credit
card information on a website which uses the insecure Http protocol. The
question is:
Would you enter your credit card information on a web site whose address
starts with “http://”?
(e.g. http://www.example.com/ )
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security oriented education
and security awareness. A part of the population perceives only their credit
card information as something with monetary value and not their password;
this question is expected to assist in the examination of what people might
perceive as critical information.
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Twenty-seventh Question This question evaluates the user vulnerability by
giving a real life example of a social engineering attack. The question is:
You receive by postal mail at your work address a program which is labeled
as “critical security updates” and installation instructions. Would you install
it?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. At the given example an attacker attempts to take advantage of
the user’s sense of responsibility towards the system security. A user who re-
ceives a program which by first look is identified as something critical to the
system security, might install it without considering the origin of it. The suc-
cess rate of such an attack might be even higher if the package looks genuine
and when labelled as it was send by the Information Technology department
of the targeted institution.
Twenty-eighth Question This question evaluates the user vulnerability by
giving a real life example of a social engineering attack. The question is:
Your work computer fails to connect to the Internet; you receive a call from
someone who identifies himself as a network technician and requires your
username and password in order to repair your connection. Would you give
your username and password over the phone?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. At the given example an attacker attempts to take advantage of
a user’s need which arises. The attacker contacts by phone the user who has
a problem and asks for his credentials in order to give a solution. The user
might give away his username and password, driven by the need to solve his
problem and from the fact that the attacker called him knowing already that
the problem exists. Users are usually not aware of the fact that attackers might
fabricate problems in order to proceed in such kind of attacks[12]. The suc-
cess rate of such an attack would be higher if the attacker would make use
of a proper terminology or falsely identifies himself by the name of someone
who indeed works at the targeted institution[31]. It is worthy noticing that if
the attacker will indeed solve the users problem, then there will be possibly a
trust relationship and familiarity between the user and the attacker; where the
latter could unauthorized keep asking for favours[12].
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Twenty-ninth Question This question evaluates the user vulnerability by
giving a real life example of a social engineering attack. The question is:
You have placed some time ago an Internet based order; you receive a call
from someone who identifies as salesman from that store and asks you for
your credit card information in order to dispatch your purchase. Would you
give your credit card information over the phone?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and re-
sponsibility. The given example is similar to the one of the previous question,
with the exception that the problem is fabricated. The attacker gained knowl-
edge of the user’s order placement and attacks his need of having the order
dispatched. The false authentication of the attacker and the fact that he knows
details that no one else would normally do, along with the need of the user for
having his order completed, might lead to a successful retrieval of the credit
card information. The users might respond differently in accordance to their
monetary value perception, similarly to the twenty-sixth question.
Installation Environment
The user property of installation environment investigates primarily the users’
security alertness in relation to the work environment and secondarily the en-
vironment itself.
Thirtieth Question This question checks if the user has the same username
for several accounts. The question is:
Do you use a common username for many kinds of accounts?
(e.g. personal account, work account)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, installa-
tion environment, responsibility and compliance. It is used in the evaluation of
all hypotheses as it indicates the security awareness of the user. A common
username enhances the ability of an attacker to relate a compromised account
with any account linked to the same person. Although this itself cannot be
perceived as a security breach, the linking of accounts when one of them is
compromised, might make the intrusion to the rest an easier task. Further-
more, the linking of several accounts combined with the usage of a common
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password, which is examined on the fifteenth question, is a critical security
risk. A recent study had shown that forty percent of online banking users
had the same username for other accounts[32]; which makes this bad security
practice, a quite frequent one.
Thirty-first Question This question checks if the user needs a password to
login to his work computer. The question is:
Do you use a password to login to your work computer?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, installa-
tion environment, responsibility and compliance. It is used in the evaluation of
all hypotheses as it indicates the security awareness of the user. A computer
system where it is required to enter a password to login, is considered more
secure than one where a password is not required.
Thirty-second Question This question examines if the user has knowledge
of the policy on password change frequency. The question is:
How often does your work require you to change your password?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• At least once per 3 months
• At least once per 6 months
• At least once per 12 months
• Never
• I don’t know
This question contributes to the user property of installation environment. It is
not used in the evaluation of any hypothesis but it adds important knowledge
regarding the security policy. A password which changes frequently is less
likely to be easily recovered.
Thirty-third Question This question checks if the user’s workplace com-
puter is inaccessible by anyone else. The question is:
Is the computer you use at work located in a physically secure location?
(i.e. not accessible by anyone else)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
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• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and instal-
lation environment. It is used in the evaluation of the fifth hypothesis as it gives
an indication of an attacker’s ability to have physical access to the targeted
computer system. Once a system’s physical security is compromised, there is
not any mean for protecting the data; even in the case of implemented encryp-
tion, a maliciously12 installed keylogger or rootkit could capture the user’s
passphrase.
Thirty-fourth Question This question evaluates if the user would allow some-
one to use his work computer under his supervision. The question is:
Would you allow someone to use your work computer with your
supervision?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, installa-
tion environment, responsibility and compliance. It is used in the evaluation of
all hypotheses as it indicates the security awareness of the user. This question
examines the same attributes like the twentieth question but focusing on the
work environment.
Thirty-fifth Question This question evaluates if the user would allow some-
one unsupervised to use his work computer. The question is:
Would you allow someone to use your work computer without your
supervision?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, installa-
tion environment, responsibility and compliance. It is used in the evaluation of
all hypotheses as it indicates the security awareness of the user. This question
examines the same attributes like the twenty-first question but focusing on the
work environment.
12Sometimes it also occurs that the employer has intentionally installed such software for
monitoring the users’ actions
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Thirty-sixth Question This question examines if the user works remotely
and whether he is aware of any prerequisite security requirements. The ques-
tion is:
If you do work from home, does your work require use of specific
technologies for secure remote access?
(e.g. Virtual Private Network, antivirus software)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
• I do not work from home
This question contributes to the user property of installation environment. It is
not used in the evaluation of any hypothesis but it adds important knowledge
regarding the security policy. An installation environment which demands
specific security criteria for remote access, is more secure than an environment
which offers access without any security mechanisms. It has been found that
users who work remotely often engage in behaviour which might expose the
system to a threat[16, 33].
Thirty-seventh Question This question checks if the user transfers data be-
tween work and home through the usage of removable media. The question
is:
Do you use removable media for transferring data between work and home?
(e.g. USB flash drive, optical disc, floppy disk)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness, installa-
tion environment and responsibility. It is used in the evaluation of the first and
fourth hypotheses as it gives a view of security awareness. The usage of re-
movable media between work and home, regardless if the contained data are
personal or work related, might introduce security risks on either computer
systems. This way of infecting is one of the oldest, since the usage of Internet
was not as common as it is nowadays, but yet removable media are still source
of many security issues. However, a frequently updated antivirus software, an
account without administrative rights and a user who has separate removable
media for his work and home, should be an efficient protection for this threat.
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Another risk which rises from the usage of removable media, especially when
those contain work oriented data, is the one of physical loss. The size and
portability of such media introduces less control over the factor of physical
ownership. In this case, implementing encryption on the data and keeping a
separate backup copy, would be enough to both make the data useless upon
loss and still have the original data available.
Thirty-eighth Question This question checks if the user is aware whether
his work computer has installed antivirus software. The question is:
Do you have antivirus software installed on your work computer?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and in-
stallation environment. It is used in the evaluation of the first, fourth and fifth
hypotheses as it gives a view of security awareness and vulnerability of instal-
lation environment. The antivirus software is one of the most basic security
software that prevents a system infection from malware. It is suggested that
a system configured for a basic security protection, should incorporate an in-
stalled antivirus[34].
Security Policy
The user property of security policy examines the policy of the installation
environment. This could be a part of the installation environment property
but it encapsulates environmental attributes which are, or can be, controlled
by the policy. In the case of the thirty-third question, policy cannot control
the enviroment if for example a laptop computer is operated; therefore, this
question is located at the user property of installation environment.
Thirty-ninth Question This question examines the current policy on antivirus
software and whether the user is aware of it. The question is:
Are you required to have antivirus software installed on your work
computer?
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
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This question contributes to the user property of security policy. It is not used in
the evaluation of any hypothesis but it adds important knowledge regarding
the security policy. Antivirus software is one of the core defences against mal-
ware; a policy with basic security on mind would require the use of antivirus
software on the work computer systems.
Fortieth Question This question queries if the user is permitted to install his
own software or hardware in his work environment. The question is:
Are you allowed to install your own software or hardware in your work
environment?
(e.g. mobile phones connected via bluetooth on your work computer, instant
messaging applications, any software that was not pre-installed at your work
environment)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
This question contributes to the user properties of security awareness and secu-
rity policy. It is used in the evaluation of the first, fourth and fifth hypotheses as
it gives an insight of the users security awareness and vulnerability surface. By
allowing the usage of customised software or hardware at the work environ-
ment we allow code execution that is unrestricted and security settings which
are set by users. An improperly configured bluetooth device could allow an
attacker within the bluetooth signal range to get access; similarly, an instant
messaging or music playing software which is not updated, or even malicious
from source software13[35], would be a definite point of intrusion. A security
oriented policy would have to disable by default the ability for installation of
any external software or hardware, and allow the opposite only in case that it
is absolutely required.
Forty-first Question This question checks if the user is required to install his
own software of hardware in his work environment. The question is:
Are you required to install your own software or hardware in your work
environment?
(e.g. email client software, web browser, web browser extensions)
The user has to choose one of the following options:
• Yes
13e.g. illegally distributed software or pirate software
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• No
• I don’t know
This question contributes to the user property of security policy. It is not used in
the evaluation of any hypothesis but it adds important knowledge regarding
the security policy. If a user is required to install software or hardware in
his work environment, then the policy should take the appropriate measures
for ensuring the system security. Not all users can be responsible for such a
process, but the ones who have the technical and appropriate security oriented
knowledge.
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Chapter 4
Results Evaluation
This chapter consists of the data coding, interpretation and evaluation. The
participants’ answers were encoded from the original form into an analyzable
format. The interpreted data were later used for creating general observations
from the results and evaluating the hypotheses. The hypotheses evaluation
will generate new knowledge by either confirmation or refutation of each hy-
pothesis.
The participation from Oslo University College and Domi Educational Group
was 59%1 and 27%2 respectively. The high difference of participation might
be caused from the fact that the survey was distributed to Domi Educational
Group in English, while Oslo University College had a Norwegian translation
of it.
4.1 Data Coding
Data coding is the process where the questions input is converted to a format
which allows data analysis. For the process of data coding the R software was
used; every question was interpreted in a way that assigns value when cer-
tain criteria are satisfied. As most of the questions were only receiving Yes
and No answers, the interpretation was usually a boolean function of the form
(d$q1 ==′ Y es′); where d is the data, q1 is the question and ′Y es′ is the criteria
upon which the boolean function is checked. Once a boolean function would
be true, it would increase the score on the perspective axis of the analyzed
hypothesis. The questions which had a range of values to choose from, were
coded by using the sum of multiple boolean functions, with each answer get-
ting a score in relation to the other options; the higher importance an answer
would have, the larger the contribution would be on the score of the perspec-
tive axis. The categorization of other cases3 in which the data coding was
different, is examined later. The general observations were created by using
the sum() command on certain boolean functions and the histograms derived
by using the hist() command on each hypothesis axes. The functions which
1Oslo University College participation was 294 from a target group of 500
2Domi Educational Group participation was 40 from a target group of 150
3i.e. password scoring system, uncertainty answers
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were used for the evaluation of the hypotheses can be found in Table 4.1.
4.1.1 Password Scoring System
The twelfth and thirteenth question examine the user’s knowledge on gener-
ating a strong password; the categorization of the user’s answers was made
through creating a password scoring system. Each password characteristic
would either add no score, or add a given score when the user’s choices satisfy
certain criteria. The password characteristics were separated into very good,
good and bad. Using phrases for a password generation was chosen as very
good password characteristic which when encountered, the user’s password
score would increase by two. As good password characteristics were chosen
the following:
• Not using dictionary words
• Not using personal information
• Combining lowercase and uppercase letters
• Using symbols
• Using numbers
• Be at least 8 or more characters long
When each of the above good characteristics would be encountered the
user’s password score would increase by one. Any other choice would result
on a poor password generation and therefore it would be given no score.
4.1.2 Uncertainty Answers
The reason for adding answer options4 which include uncertainty, was be-
cause people could be unaware or not sure about something. However, uncer-
tainty in Information Security can be seen as possibility of a system exposure[5].
As near misses are like accidents which are waiting to happen, any answer
which incorporated uncertainty had the score of the most related answer with
certainty. For example, any answer of a user on sixteenth question except the
negative one would mean that there is a possibility of writing down a pass-
word that is difficult to remember.
4.2 Data Interpretation
During the process of data interpretation the quantified data are used for the
hypotheses evaluation. The first and second dimension of each hypothesis
4i.e. I don’t know, maybe
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q1 N/A
q2 N/A
q3 (d$q3==’Less than 3 hours’) + (d$q3==’3-8 hours’)*2 + (d$q3==’More than 8
hours’)*3
q4 (d$q4==’Less than once per week’) + (d$q4==’At least once per week’)*2 +
(d$q4==’At least once per day’)*3 + (d$q4==’At least once per hour’)*4
q5 (d$q5==’Yes’)
q6 (d$q6==’Yes’)
q7 (d$q7==’5’) + (d$q7==’4’)*2 + (d$q7==’3’)*3 + (d$q7==’2’)*4 + (d$q7==’1’)*5
q8 (d$q8==’5’) + (d$q8==’4’)*2 + (d$q8==’3’)*3 + (d$q8==’2’)*4 + (d$q8==’1’)*5
q9 (d$q9==’Yes’)
q10 (d$q10==’Yes’)
q11 (d$q11==’Yes’)
q12 (grepl(’Phrases’,d$q12))*2 + (!(grepl(’Dictionary words’,d$q12))) +
(!(grepl(’Personal Information’,d$q12))) + ((grepl(’Lowercase letters’,d$q12))
&& (grepl(’Uppercase letters’,d$q12))) + (grepl(’Symbols’,d$q12)) +
(grepl(’Numbers’,d$q12))
q13 (d$q13==’8 or more characters’)
q14 (d$q14==’Never’) + (d$q14==’Only when required by the system’)*2 +
(d$q14==’At least once per 12 months’)*3 + (d$q14==’At least once per 6
months’)*4 + (d$q14==’At least once per 3 months’)*5
q15 (d$q15==’No’)
q16 (d$q16==’No’)
q17 (d$q17==’No’)
q18 (d$q18==’Yes’)
q19 (d$q19==’Yes’)
q20 (d$q20==’No’)
q21 (d$q21==’No’)
q22 (d$q22==’No’)
q23 (d$q23==’No’)
q24 (d$q24==’No’)
q25 (d$q25==’No’)
q26 (d$q26==’No’)
q27 (d$q27==’No’)
q28 (d$q28==’No’)
q29 (d$q29==’No’)
q30 (d$q30==’No’)
q31 (d$q31==’Yes’)
q32 N/A
q33 (d$q33==’Yes’)
q34 (d$q34==’No’)
q35 (d$q35==’No’)
q36 N/A
q37 (d$q37==’No’)
q38 (d$q38==’Yes’)
q39 N/A
q40 (d$q40==’No’)
q41 N/A
Table 4.1: Functions for the Hypotheses Evaluation
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would serve as independent and dependent variables respectively; both vari-
ables would receive score from the particular to them questions5. The vari-
ables are plotted in a two-dimensional diagram which visualise the score dis-
tribution. In the plots, each point represents a user’s score; the more scores a
point would sum, the larger it would appear. For enhancing the data inter-
pretation, the axes histograms are plotted as well. The purpose of plotting is
to find trends on data distribution which would be useful on the hypotheses
evaluation. In addition, the median score was used for measuring the central
tendency of the axes; which was found particularly useful in comparing the
responses from the two participating institutions.
4.3 General Observations
Apart from the hypotheses evaluation, the survey can offer a highly informa-
tive input when the questions are seen either individually or in relation to
each other. As a comprehensive evaluation of all possible questions associa-
tions would be a highly time consuming process, the purpose of this section is
to view a noteworthy part of these results. The developed R code which was
used for this section can be found in the Appendices. Table 4.2 lists vertically
the cases and horizontally the results; percentages were calculated in relation
to the total participation and results got rounded to the nearest integer.
5See Figure 3.2
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4.4 First Hypothesis
The first hypothesis examines whether people with higher technology interac-
tion show increased security awareness. From the given results in Figure 4.1a
a diagonal distribution can be seen which can be also matched with the equiv-
alent histogram in Figure 4.2, where the values are lowered in the centre of
the axis. For Oslo University College the overall distribution of values shows
less interaction with technology and higher security awareness in comparison
with the one from Domi Educational Group. However, the limited responses
of Domi Educational Group would not allow to derive any conclusions.
First Hypothesis Results Representation
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(a) Oslo University College
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(b) Domi Educational Group
Figure 4.1: First Hypothesis Results Representation
According to Table 4.3, the median values of both institutions results seem
to be close; comparing the histograms of both axes seem to show a difference
which most probably occur due to the limited sample of Domi Educational
Group. The particularly high difference can be spotted by closely examining
Figure 4.3b, where the distributions are different with most of the results being
on the rightmost side; having the leftmost side rather limited in comparison
with Figure 4.3a. As there is evidence of interaction with technology increasing
in parallel with security awareness, the hypothesis is confirmed.
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Table 4.3: Median Values for the axes of First Hypothesis
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Figure 4.2: First Hypothesis x axis Histogram
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Figure 4.3: First Hypothesis y axis Histogram
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4.5 Second Hypothesis
The second hypothesis evaluates if the population who perceives personal and
work data as more important to protect, is less vulnerable to attacks. The de-
rived results in Figure 4.4a show that the rightmost part with value 10, which
is the part where people consider both work and home data as extremely im-
portant, is on average less vulnerable than the rest of the answers; something
which does not appear to exist at the results from Domi Educational Group as
seen in Figure 4.4b.
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Figure 4.4: Second Hypothesis Results Representation
The data from Domi Educational Group show some irregularities when
compared to the ones from Oslo University College. Although the axes me-
dian values do not significantly differ as the Table 4.4 indicates, according
to Figures 4.5 and 4.6 the distribution of scores is quite irregular in compar-
ison with Oslo University College. A possible reason for this might be the
smaller participation from Domi Educational Group. As the results in Figure
4.4a show, the hypothesis is confirmed because people with higher perception
of data importance show a higher invulnerability level than all the rest.
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Figure 4.5: Second Hypothesis x axis Histogram
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Figure 4.6: Second Hypothesis y axis Histogram
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4.6 Third Hypothesis
The third hypothesis examines if population with a higher security education
would be less vulnerable to attacks. By having a look at Figure 4.7a one can
see that the results appear to be spread diagonally. Both institutions appear to
have a similar result distribution but the limited resolution of the results from
Domi Educational Group would again prevent deriving any conclusions.
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Third Hypothesis Results Representation
Security Education
Ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n 
In
vu
ln
er
a
bi
lity
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
4 6 8 10 12
n
l 1.0
l 1.5
l 2.0
l 2.5
l 3.0
(b) Domi Educational Group
Figure 4.7: Third Hypothesis Results Representation
Both institutions median values are very close as seen from Table 4.5. By
comparing the histograms in Figure 4.8 one can see that they have an almost
identical pattern which differs only at the resolution. The noticeable difference
between the two institutions results surfaces when comparing the histogram
found in Figure 4.9; while Figure 4.9a shows an approximately normal curve
distribution, Figure 4.9b seems to have less results on the left part of the his-
togram; something which also excuses the smaller median value for the y axis
of Domi Educational Group found at Table 4.5. As the Figure 4.7a shows a di-
agonal spread of the results, it is confirmed that to some extent, higher security
education correlates with higher exploitation invulnerability.
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Figure 4.8: Third Hypothesis x axis Histogram
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Figure 4.9: Third Hypothesis y axis Histogram
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4.7 Fourth Hypothesis
The fourth hypothesis examines whether people who experienced a security
incident in the past are more security-aware. Figure 4.10a demonstrates the
opposite result than the original assumption; people who had no prior secu-
rity incidents seem to be on average more security-aware than people who
had one or both types of the examined security incidents. A similar trend is
demonstrated from the results of Domi Educational Group in Figure 4.10b,
although with a reduced resolution due to limited responses.
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Figure 4.10: Fourth Hypothesis Results Representation
Although the median values of both institutions, as seen in Table 4.6, do
not appear to have a large difference, the distribution of both axes values dif-
fer significantly. By comparing the Figures 4.11a and 4.11b one can see that
the results of the latter for value 0 are rather limited proportionally to the first;
something which also gets visually confirmed by Figure 4.10b. The histograms
in Figure 4.12 could have a similar distribution, but due to the limited resolu-
tion of Figure 4.12b it is not possible to derive any conclusion. As the results
of Oslo University College in Figure 4.10a show lower security awareness for
people with prior security incidents, the hypothesis is not supported.
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Figure 4.11: Fourth Hypothesis x axis Histogram
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Figure 4.12: Fourth Hypothesis y axis Histogram
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4.8 Fifth Hypothesis
The fifth hypothesis evaluates whether invulnerability to social engineering
does not correlate with other invulnerabilities. An initial look in Figures 4.13a
and 4.13b shows an opposite diagonal orientation for each. While in Figure
4.13a the other invulnerabilities show a relative increase in relation to higher
values of social engineering invulnerability, Figure 4.13b shows a decrease.
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Figure 4.13: Fifth Hypothesis Results Representation
The median values in Table 4.7 show the same results for both institutions;
however, the distribution of values as seen in Figures 4.14 and 4.15 looks differ-
ent between the two participating institutions. Figure 4.15b has a particularly
unusual pattern in relation to Figure 4.15a. As the results do not demonstrate
evidence of correlation between social engineering and other invulnerabilities,
the hypothesis is confirmed.
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Figure 4.14: Fifth Hypothesis x axis Histogram
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Figure 4.15: Fifth Hypothesis y axis Histogram
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Chapter 5
Future Suggestions
This research answer a question which could attract further study or conduct
an evaluation from other perspectives; the offered knowledge can be the basis
for further investigation of the human factor in another setting. A noteworthy
enhancement on the current study would be the addition of weighting fac-
tors to each question; a possibility which was not implemented due to time
constraints, but would result on a more concrete output. As not all questions
have the same importance or possibility to occur, it would be more consistent
to evaluate them in regards to each other as well, and not only to add their
score in a co-variable. Additionally, it would be of a high interest, but ethi-
cally questionable, to investigate the human factor vulnerability by an on-site
exploitation in a controlled environment1; this method would significantly re-
duce the error probability and would give a better insight of the human factor
status. Finally, an alternative approach by applying a qualitative or mixed re-
search method, could give surface to the reasons behind peoples’ actions.
Some future considerations which adjust the followed topic, would be to
additionally discuss the intentional attack of one on his own premises; a study
which would result to an overall evaluation of the human factor, regardless
of the attack source and nature. The human factor in Information Security
could be also examined in relation to the dimensions of productivity, cost and
usability; dimensions particularly interesting for a corporate environment.
1Always with the granted permission of the respective administration
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Amateurs hack systems, professionals hack people.
Bruce Schneier
Human factors can have a high impact in Information Security; the current
study investigated the influence of human factors in regards to accidental ex-
posure. In confirmation of past research, findings prove that a high number
of users would engage into actions which could make the system subject to an
attack. Users’ behaviour have been shown to be related to technology inter-
action, data importance perception and security oriented education; while the
presence of a previous security incident, does not indicate that people would
be more aware of security threats in the future. Furthermore, there is evidence
that users who are invulnerable to various types of attacks, are not necessarily
also invulnerable to social engineering attacks; something initially expected as
the latter are harder to detect and respond.
The answer on the human factor security issues can be supplied by ed-
ucation. Security oriented education can address the human factor problem
by increasing the users’ practical1 and theoretical2 knowledge. Similarly, the
data importance perception could be used in addressing the human factor by
increasing the users’ feeling of responsibility; users would then understand
why security is necessary in the given circumstances. Additionally, attention
should be given on addressing the social engineering vulnerabilities; such at-
tacks exploit directly the human factor with a high effectiveness. Users would
have to receive a series of social engineering case studies as examples, and
training on how to authenticate people.
As long as Information Technology systems have the human as a prereq-
uisite component, a responsible security evaluation process should without
doubt include users. With both technology and people evolving by time, secu-
rity should parallely adopt and progress according to the new advances. Even
under the ideal thought of a faultless system, people would still be subject to
an error and therefore, a potential point of intrusion.
1e.g. password generation
2e.g. recognizing attacks
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Appendix G
Informed Consent
This is a survey which evaluates the human factors in information security; it
is part of a research study made by Theodoros Nikolakopoulos, master stu-
dent at Oslo University College and University of Oslo. It has been approved
by 1. The distribution of the survey at the institution staff has been made by
the IT Department.
The Terms and Conditions of the survey are the following:
1. Non-coercion
By completing the following questionnaire and pressing the “Send” button
you confirm that you willingly participate in the research study.
2. Confidentiality
The gathered data will be kept strictly confidential and the only one who will
have access will be the one who conducts the research study. The participants
and the institution may have access only on the publicly available research
study results upon request, and not on the individual data.
3. Maintenance of Privacy
The participation in this survey remain by all means anonymous. By the sub-
mitted answers it will not be possible to identify any individual.
4. Protection From Harm
The current research study will not have any physical harm on the partici-
pants. If you do believe that you might suffer a psychological harm from the
completion of this survey, please avoid from doing so and feel free to submit
your feedback by using one of the below mentioned emails.
For any related questions please contact the research study conductor at:
Theodoros.Nikolakopoulos@stud.iu.hio.no
TheodoN@ifi.uio.no
1Konstantinos Katsifis, for Domi Educational Group; A˚sulv Frøysnes and Ole Lycke, for
Oslo University College
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Appendix H
R code for General Observations
1 d <− read . csv ( ’ data no . csv ’ )
2 #Read t h e survey da t a
3
4 sum( d$q11== ’No ’ )
5 #Users who had neve r r e c e i v e d s e c u r i t y t r a i n i n g
6
7 sum( d$q13 ! = ’ 8 or more c h a r a c t e r s ’ )
8 #Users who g e n e r a t e on av e r a g e pas swords which a r e l e s s
than e i g h t c h a r a c t e r s
9
10 sum( d$q15 [ d$q30== ’ Yes ’ ]== ’ Yes ’ )
11 #Users who use a common username and password f o r s e v e r a l
a c c oun t s
12
13 sum( d$q16 ! = ’No ’ )
14 #Users who would w r i t e down a c omp l i c a t e d password
15
16 sum( d$q22== ’ Yes ’ )
17 #Users who would open an ema i l l i n k or a t t a chmen t from an
a d d r e s s t h ey r e c o g n i z e
18
19 sum( d$q23== ’ Yes ’ )
20 #Users who would open an ema i l l i n k or a t t a chmen t from an
a d d r e s s t h ey do not r e c o g n i z e
21
22 sum( d$q24== ’ Yes ’ )
23 #Users who would s h a r e t h e i r c r e d e n t i a l s wi th someone
e l s e
24
25 sum ( ( ( d$q25== ’ Yes ’ ) +(d$q26== ’ Yes ’ ) ) ! = ’ 0 ’ )
26 #Users who would e n t e r t h e i r c r e d e n t i a l s o r c r e d i t c a rd
i n f o rma t i o n on an i n s e c u r e w e b s i t e
27
67
28 sum ( ( ( d$q25== ’ Yes ’ ) +(d$q26== ’ Yes ’ ) ) == ’ 2 ’ )
29 #Users who would e n t e r t h e i r c r e d e n t i a l s and c r e d i t c a rd
i n f o rma t i o n on an i n s e c u r e w e b s i t e
30
31 sum( d$q34== ’ Yes ’ )
32 #Users who would a l l ow someone t o use t h e i r work computer
wi th t h e i r s u p e r v i s i o n
33
34 sum( d$q35== ’ Yes ’ )
35 #Users who would a l l ow someone t o use t h e i r work computer
w i thou t t h e i r s u p e r v i s i o n
36
37 sum( d$q34 [ d$q20== ’No ’ ]== ’ Yes ’ )
38 #Users who would a l l ow someone t o use t h e i r work computer
wi th t h e i r s u p e r v i s i o n , but not t h e i r home computer
39
40 sum( d$q35 [ d$q21== ’No ’ ]== ’ Yes ’ )
41 #Users who would a l l ow someone t o use t h e i r work computer
w i thou t t h e i r s u p e r v i s i o n , but not t h e i r home
computer
42
43 sum( d$q37 [ d$q19 ! = ’ Yes ’ ]== ’ Yes ’ )
44 #Users who t r a n s f e r d a t a be tween work and home , and do
not have an a n t i v i r u s i n s t a l l e d on t h e i r home computer
45
46 sum( d$q41 [ d$q1 ! = ’ P r o f e s s i o n a l ( e . g . adminis ter ing systems
f o r other users ) ’ ]== ’ Yes ’ )
47 #Users who a r e r e q u i r e d t o i n s t a l l s o f tw a r e or hardware ,
and do not have p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l s
48
49 sum( d$q40== ’ Yes ’ )
50 #Users who a r e a l l ow ed t o i n s t a l l t h e i r own s o f tw a r e or
hardware a t work
Appendix I
R code for Hypotheses
Evaluation
1 l i b r a r y ( ggplot2 )
2 #Load t h e ggp l o t 2 l i b r a r y
3
4 theme s e t ( theme bw( ) )
5 # Se t t h e theme t o B l a c k / White f o r g gp l o t 2
6
7 d <− read . csv ( ’ data no . csv ’ )
8 #Read t h e survey da t a
9
10 hyp1x no <− ( d$q15== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q16== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q17== ’No ’ )
+ ( d$q18== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q19== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q20== ’No ’ ) + (
d$q21== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q22== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q23== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q24
== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q25== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q26== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q27== ’No ’
) + ( d$q28== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q29== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q30== ’No ’ ) + ( d
$q31== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q34== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q35== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q37
== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q38== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q40== ’No ’ )
11 # C a l c u l a t e x f o r t h e f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s
12
13 hyp1y no <− ( d$q3== ’ Less than 3 hours ’ ) + ( d$q3== ’3−8
hours ’ ) * 2 + ( d$q3== ’More than 8 hours ’ ) * 3 + ( d$q4== ’
Less than once per week ’ ) + ( d$q4== ’ At l e a s t once per
week ’ ) * 2 + ( d$q4== ’ At l e a s t once per day ’ ) * 3 + ( d$q4==
’ At l e a s t once per hour ’ ) * 4 + ( d$q5== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q6== ’
Yes ’ )
14 # C a l c u l a t e y f o r t h e f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s
15
16 hyp2x no <− ( d$q7== ’ 5 ’ ) + ( d$q7== ’ 4 ’ ) * 2 + ( d$q7== ’ 3 ’ ) * 3 +
( d$q7== ’ 2 ’ ) * 4 + ( d$q7== ’ 1 ’ ) * 5 + ( d$q8== ’ 5 ’ ) + ( d$q8==
’ 4 ’ ) * 2 + ( d$q8== ’ 3 ’ ) * 3 + ( d$q8== ’ 2 ’ ) * 4 + ( d$q8== ’ 1 ’ ) * 5
17 # C a l c u l a t e x f o r t h e s e c ond h y p o t h e s i s
18
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19 hyp2y no <− ( d$q15== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q16== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q17== ’No ’ )
+ ( d$q18== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q19== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q20== ’No ’ ) + (
d$q21== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q22== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q23== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q24
== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q25== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q26== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q27== ’No ’
) + ( d$q28== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q29== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q30== ’No ’ ) + ( d
$q31== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q34== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q35== ’No ’ )
20 # C a l c u l a t e y f o r t h e s e c ond h y p o t h e s i s
21
22 hyp3x no <− ( d$q11== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( grepl ( ’ Phrases ’ ,d$q12 ) ) * 2 +
( ! ( grepl ( ’ Dic t ionary words ’ ,d$q12 ) ) ) + ( ! ( grepl ( ’
Personal Information ’ ,d$q12 ) ) ) + ( ( grepl ( ’ Lowercase
l e t t e r s ’ ,d$q12 ) ) && ( grepl ( ’ Uppercase l e t t e r s ’ ,d$q12 ) )
) + ( grepl ( ’ Symbols ’ ,d$q12 ) ) + ( grepl ( ’Numbers ’ ,d$q12 )
) + ( d$q13== ’ 8 or more c h a r a c t e r s ’ ) + ( d$q14== ’ Never ’ )
+ ( d$q14== ’ Only when required by the system ’ ) * 2 + ( d$
q14== ’ At l e a s t once per 12 months ’ ) * 3 + ( d$q14== ’ At
l e a s t once per 6 months ’ ) * 4 + ( d$q14== ’ At l e a s t once
per 3 months ’ ) * 5
23 # C a l c u l a t e x f o r t h e t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s
24
25 hyp3y no <− ( d$q15== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q16== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q17== ’No ’ )
+ ( d$q18== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q19== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q20== ’No ’ ) + (
d$q21== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q22== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q23== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q24
== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q25== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q26== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q27== ’No ’
) + ( d$q28== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q29== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q30== ’No ’ ) + ( d
$q31== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q34== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q35== ’No ’ )
26 # C a l c u l a t e y f o r t h e t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s
27
28 hyp4x no <− ( d$q9== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q10== ’ Yes ’ )
29 # C a l c u l a t e x f o r t h e f o u r t h h y p o t h e s i s
30
31 hyp4y no <− ( d$q15== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q16== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q17== ’No ’ )
+ ( d$q18== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q19== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q20== ’No ’ ) + (
d$q21== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q22== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q23== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q24
== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q25== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q26== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q27== ’No ’
) + ( d$q28== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q29== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q30== ’No ’ ) + ( d
$q31== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q34== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q35== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q37
== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q38== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q40== ’No ’ )
32 # C a l c u l a t e y f o r t h e f o u r t h h y p o t h e s i s
33
34 hyp5x no <− ( d$q20== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q21== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q22== ’No ’ )
+ ( d$q23== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q24== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q27== ’No ’ ) + ( d$
q28== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q29== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q34== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q35== ’
No ’ )
35 # C a l c u l a t e x f o r t h e f i f t h h y p o t h e s i s
36
37 hyp5y no <− ( d$q15== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q16== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q17== ’No ’ )
+ ( d$q18== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q19== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q25== ’No ’ ) + (
d$q26== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q30== ’No ’ ) + ( d$q31== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q33
== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q38== ’ Yes ’ ) + ( d$q40== ’No ’ )
38 # C a l c u l a t e y f o r t h e f i f t h h y p o t h e s i s
39
40 ggplot ( data . frame ( x=hyp1x no , y=hyp1y no ) , aes ( x = x , y =
y ) ) + s t a t sum( aes ( s i z e = . . n . . ) ) + opts ( t i t l e = ’ F i r s t
Hypothesis Resu l t s Representat ion ’ ) + xlab ( ’ S e c u r i t y
Awareness ’ ) + ylab ( ’ I n t e r a c t i o n with Technology ’ )
41 ggsave ( f i lename= ’ hyp1 no . pdf ’ , dpi =600)
42 #Output t o pd f t h e f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s r e s u l t s
43
44 ggplot ( data . frame ( x=hyp2x no , y=hyp2y no ) , aes ( x = x , y =
y ) ) + s t a t sum( aes ( s i z e = . . n . . ) ) + opts ( t i t l e = ’
Second Hypothesis Resu l t s Representat ion ’ ) + xlab ( ’
Data Importance Percept ion ’ ) + ylab ( ’ E x p l o i t a t i o n
I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y ’ )
45 ggsave ( f i lename= ’ hyp2 no . pdf ’ , dpi =600)
46 #Output t o pd f t h e s e c ond h y p o t h e s i s r e s u l t s
47
48 ggplot ( data . frame ( x=hyp3x no , y=hyp3y no ) , aes ( x = x , y =
y ) ) + s t a t sum( aes ( s i z e = . . n . . ) ) + opts ( t i t l e = ’ Third
Hypothesis Resu l t s Representat ion ’ ) + xlab ( ’ S e c u r i t y
Education ’ ) + ylab ( ’ E x p l o i t a t i o n I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y ’ )
49 ggsave ( f i lename= ’ hyp3 no . pdf ’ , dpi =600)
50 #Output t o pd f t h e t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s r e s u l t s
51
52 ggplot ( data . frame ( x=hyp4x no , y=hyp4y no ) , aes ( x = x , y =
y ) ) + s t a t sum( aes ( s i z e = . . n . . ) ) + opts ( t i t l e = ’
Fourth Hypothesis Resu l t s Representat ion ’ ) + xlab ( ’
Past E x p l o i t a t i o n Record ’ ) + ylab ( ’ S e c u r i t y Awareness ’
)
53 ggsave ( f i lename= ’ hyp4 no . pdf ’ , dpi =600)
54 #Output t o pd f t h e f o u r t h h y p o t h e s i s r e s u l t s
55
56 ggplot ( data . frame ( x=hyp5x no , y=hyp5y no ) , aes ( x = x , y =
y ) ) + s t a t sum( aes ( s i z e = . . n . . ) ) + opts ( t i t l e = ’ F i f t h
Hypothesis Resu l t s Representat ion ’ ) + xlab ( ’ S o c i a l
Engineering I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y ’ ) + ylab ( ’ Other
I n v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s ’ )
57 ggsave ( f i lename= ’ hyp5 no . pdf ’ , dpi =600)
58 #Output t o pd f t h e f i f t h h y p o t h e s i s r e s u l t s
59
60 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp1x no . pdf ’ )
61 h i s t ( hyp1x no , main= ’ F i r s t Hypothesis x a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ S e c u r i t y Awareness ’ )
62 dev . off ( )
63 #Output t o pd f t h e f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s x a x i s h i s t og r am
64
65 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp1y no . pdf ’ )
66 h i s t ( hyp1y no , main= ’ F i r s t Hypothesis y a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ I n t e r a c t i o n with Technology ’ )
67 dev . off ( )
68 #Output t o pd f t h e f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s y a x i s h i s t og r am
69
70 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp2x no . pdf ’ )
71 h i s t ( hyp2x no , main= ’ Second Hypothesis x a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ Data Importance Percept ion ’ )
72 dev . off ( )
73 #Output t o pd f t h e s e c ond h y p o t h e s i s x a x i s h i s t og r am
74
75 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp2y no . pdf ’ )
76 h i s t ( hyp2y no , main= ’ Second Hypothesis y a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ E x p l o i t a t i o n I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y ’ )
77 dev . off ( )
78 #Output t o pd f t h e s e c ond h y p o t h e s i s y a x i s h i s t og r am
79
80 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp3x no . pdf ’ )
81 h i s t ( hyp3x no , main= ’ Third Hypothesis x a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ S e c u r i t y Education ’ )
82 dev . off ( )
83 #Output t o pd f t h e t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s x a x i s h i s t og r am
84
85 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp3y no . pdf ’ )
86 h i s t ( hyp3y no , main= ’ Third Hypothesis y a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ E x p l o i t a t i o n I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y ’ )
87 dev . off ( )
88 #Output t o pd f t h e t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s y a x i s h i s t og r am
89
90 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp4x no . pdf ’ )
91 h i s t ( hyp4x no , main= ’ Fourth Hypothesis x a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ Past E x p l o i t a t i o n Record ’ )
92 dev . off ( )
93 #Output t o pd f t h e f o u r t h h y p o t h e s i s x a x i s h i s t og r am
94
95 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp4y no . pdf ’ )
96 h i s t ( hyp4y no , main= ’ Fourth Hypothesis y a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ S e c u r i t y Awareness ’ )
97 dev . off ( )
98 #Output t o pd f t h e f o u r t h h y p o t h e s i s y a x i s h i s t og r am
99
100 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp5x no . pdf ’ )
101 h i s t ( hyp5x no , main= ’ F i f t h Hypothesis x a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ S o c i a l Engineering I n v u l n e r a b i l i t y ’ )
102 dev . off ( )
103 #Output t o pd f t h e f i f t h h y p o t h e s i s x a x i s h i s t og r am
104
105 pdf ( f i l e = ’ hyp5y no . pdf ’ )
106 h i s t ( hyp5y no , main= ’ F i f t h Hypothesis y a x i s Histogram ’ ,
xlab= ’ Other I n v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s ’ )
107 dev . off ( )
108 #Output t o pd f t h e f i f t h h y p o t h e s i s y a x i s h i s t og r am
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